Abstract is paper examines the impact of bank competition on rms' access to credit using a large panel of 900 banks matched to almost 60.000 rms across the euro area over the period [2010][2011][2012][2013][2014][2015][2016]. Results provide empirical support for the market power hypothesis whereby low interbank competition worsens rms' credit conditions. We nd that higher bank market power is associated with lower short and long-term bank credit, higher reliance on trade credit and higher funding costs for customer rms. Furthermore, high bank market power is especially detrimental for opaque rms, suggesting that lower inter-bank competition exacerbates the nancial constraint of borrowers that are more exposed to information problems. By contrast, we nd limited evidence consistent with the information hypothesis: among rms related to banks with high market power, those served by small banks are less credit constrained than those served by large banks.
Introduction
Does inter-bank competition ultimately bene ts rms' access to credit? Unlike most industries, the peculiar features inherent to the banking business and the key role of information prevent a straightforward answer. Indeed, economic theory makes con ictive predictions on whether borrowers bene t from competition between lenders. On the one hand, the market power hypothesis holds that greater competition leads to higher and cheaper allocation of credit to rms (Pagano, 1993) . On the other hand, the information hypothesis argues that banks are more likely to form long-term relationships with borrowers when operating in a non-competitive market. Strong competition would hence discourage relationship lending and impair rms' access to credit Rajan, 1994, 1995) .
Current interest in banking consolidation across the European Union (EU) further underscores the salience of this issue.
e move to a Banking Union is expected to usher in greater cross-border banking consolidation by creating a large EU-wide banking market (?). Furthermore, there is a widespread concern that the EU's over-reliance on banks has adverse implications for nancial stability and economic growth (Lang eld and Pagano, 2016; Nuoy, 2017) . 1 As a result, EU policy makers tend to welcome cross-border banking consolidation as a vector of European nancial integration as well as a remedy to overbanking (Nuoy, 2017) . However, less a ention is being devoted to the potential implications of greater bank concentration on corporate credit conditions.
In this paper we empirically investigate the impact of inter-bank competition on rms' access to credit by using a database that matches almost 60.000 rms to 900 banks located in the euro area over the period 2010-2016. e structure of the data allows to directly test how a bank's market power -as measured by the Lerner index at the bank level -a ects the credit availability of its customer rms. Similarly to Weinstein (2011, 2013) , we exploit the variation in the credit availability of rms within the same industry but related to banks with di erent levels of market power. is procedure allows to identify the e ect of bank competition on nancial constraint net of industry-wide credit demand. Lender and borrower speci c determinants of nancial constraint are also controlled for through balance sheet and income statement information at both rm and bank level.
We nd evidence that rejects the information hypothesis in favour of the market power hypothesis: weaker inter-bank competition is associated with lower short and long-term bank credit, higher reliance on trade credit and higher funding costs for customer rms. Importantly, the fact that rm borrowing decreases while funding costs and reliance on trade credit increase indicates that low bank competition has a negative impact on rms through credit supply restrictions. Furthermore, we nd heterogeneous e ects of bank competition across rms and banks. In the cross-section of rms, higher bank market power is especially detrimental for credit availability precisely where the information hypothesis predicts it should be most bene cial. Among rms related to banks with high market power, small, low quality and opaque rms receive less short and long-term bank credit than large, high quality and transparent rms. Similarly, opaque rms whose relationship bank enjoys high market power also rely more on trade credit and face higher funding costs than more transparent rms. In the cross-section of banks, we nd limited evidence consistent with the information hypothesis: Among rms related to banks with high market power, rms served by large banks tend to obtain less short and long-term credit as compared to rms served by smaller banks.
Overall, we consider our results to be mostly consistent with the market power hypothesis, 1 e EU banking market is large by international standards: as of 2017, total banking assets accounted for 280% of GDP. By comparison, total assets of the US banking sector accounted for just 88% of GDP (Nuoy, 2017) . whereby lower inter-bank competition exacerbates the nancial constraint of borrowers more exposed to information problems. By contrast, the limited evidence supporting the information hypothesis suggests lower inter-bank competition may improve access to credit insofar it nurtures credit relationships between small banks and small rms who have a strong interest in forming long-term relationships (Berger et al., 2005 (Berger et al., , 2017 .
Our paper is related to the broad literature assessing the relation between bank competition and rms' access to credit.
2 Economic theory yields two contradictory predictions about such relation.
e market power hypothesis maintains that less competitive banking markets lead to restricted credit allocation at a higher price. is may come about because low inter-bank competition engenders X-ine ciencies in the absorption and intermediation of resources, thus leading to higher interest rates and/or rationing (Pagano, 1993; Guzman, 2000) and because it sti es the pressure for innovation and the expansion of nancial services to a pool of borrowers previously excluded by institutional nance (Vives, 2001) . By contrast, the information hypothesis argues that lower inter-bank competition is associated with higher credit availability.
is view is centred on credit relationships between lenders and borrowers. Since limited competition encourages relationship building and inter-temporal sharing of surplus between banks and rms, a monopolistic lender may be more willing to o er credit than a similarly placed lender in competitive market Rajan, 1994, 1995; Dell'ariccia and Marquez, 2006) . 3 Strong competition on credit markets may instead be incompatible with the creation of mutually bene cial relationships between borrowing rms and creditor banks.
Subsequent empirical work tested these theoretical predictions. For instance, Beck et al. (2004) nd that high bank concentration -as measured by banking regulatory policies and by the market share of the largest three domestic banks -tends to increase rms' reported obstacles to obtain nance. Similarly, Love and Martínez Pería (2015) nd bank concentration -as captured by the Lerner and Boone indexes at the country level -to be negatively associated with rms' reported access to credit but signi cantly less so in countries with more developed private credit information sharing schemes (e.g. credit bureaus and credit registries). Leon (2015) uses rm level data on developing and emerging countries and nds that rms' reported credit constraint appears to be alleviated by bank competition. Using rm level data on Spanish SMEs matched to regional bank data, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2007) study how bank market power a ects rm's reliance on trade credit -a proxy for nancial constraint -and nd that a negative association between bank market power and credit availability when banks' competition is captured by the Lerner index, while results are reversed if the HHI is employed. Furthermore, Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) and Berger et al. (2004) fail to nd a relation between concentration and dependence on trade credit, while Degryse and Ongena (2008) note that more concentrated market are characterised by signi cantly larger spreads in both deposit and loan markets. Other papers provide evidence in favour of the information hypothesis. For example, Marquez (2002) shows that in more competitive banking systems, borrower-speci c information tends to become more dispersed, thus entailing less e cient screening and higher lending rates. Using U.S. Internal Revenue Service data on small rms, Zarutskie (2006) nds that newly formed rms have signi cantly less outside 2 See Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) for an overview about the theoretical and empirical literature on bank concentration.
3 As noted by Petersen and Rajan (1995) , a monopolistic lender may be able to share in the future surplus of the rm through the future rents the former will be able to extract. For instance, the lender may back-load interest payments over time, so to subsidize the rm in bad times and extracting rents in good times. e same argument is made by Mayer (1988) who suggests that a monopolistic bank may be willing to provide credit to a distressed rm as it expects to reap a share of the rm's future pro t in the form of higher interest rate payments. By contrast, a bank operating in a competitive market would expect the rm to switch to cheaper funding alternatives as soon it recovers nancial health, which would discourage the bank to provide rescue funding to begin with. debt in more competitive banking markets, and suggests this may be due to the fact that stronger competition discourages lenders from nancing new rms with unknown credit quality. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Bonaccorsi di Pa i and Dell'Ariccia (2004) nd that higher concentration is positively related to growth in industrial sectors that are more dependent on external nance. More recently, using a panel of rms from 20 European countries covering the period 2001 , Fungáčová et al. (2014 nd that stronger inter-bank competition (as measured by both structural and non-structural metrics computed at the country-level) tends to increase the cost of credit for corporate borrowers, particularly so for small rms.
Our paper makes two main contributions to this empirical literature. First, we investigate the relationship between bank competition and rm credit availability using a database that matches rms to their reference bank. 4 We are therefore able to measure directly how a rm's credit outcomes respond to changes in its relationship bank's market power, while simultaneously controlling for rm, bank and industry characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study to employ matched data to measure the e ect of bank competition on rms' nancial constraint. We claim that this advances current literature for the following reasons. First, from the perspective of bank competition, the relevant lending markets may be local in nature (Maudos and de Guevara, 2007; Berger et al., 2009; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Drechsler et al., 2017) . In this sense, using Lerner indexes at the bank-level, rather than country or regional averages, may better capture the degree of local market power of nancial intermediaries faced by borrowing rms. Second, this data allow to explicitly take into account the role of bank-rm relationships, which is crucial to e ectively discriminate between the market power and information hypotheses, since the la er is predicated upon the importance of such lending relationships.
Second, we uncover and measure important heterogeneities in how bank competition a ects credit availability across rms. In this sense, our paper is related to Ryan et al. (2014) who nd important heterogeneity across rm size and opacity in the way bank competition a ects SME nancing constraints. Our results corroborate and expand their work by nding that weaker inter-bank competition worsens access to credit for opaque,small and illiquid rms. e nding that bank competition does not a ect all rms and banks equally has potential consequence for competition policies aimed at maintaining a competitive banking environment and the provision of credit to rms, in particular to nancially constrained rms and SMEs. e rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our database and details the derivation of the Lerner index as measure of bank market power. e identi cation strategy and the econometric model are also discussed. Results are presented in section 3, while section 4 concludes.
Empirical strategy

Matched rm-bank data
We combine bank data from Orbis Bank Focus with rm data from Amadeus Banker. 5 Restricting our research to the euro area, we extract annual information on 3.650 banks and 2.056.537 rms for the period 2010-2016. We then match banks to rms using the information on the identity of rms' reference banks contained in Amadeus Banker as in Dwenger et al. (2018) and De Marco (2019) . Speci cally, we perform a "fuzzy merge" using bank names and country location reported in each database. 6 Restricting the sample to banks for which the Lerner index could be estimated yields to a nal database containing 335.656 bank-rm observations: 901 banks matched to 59.023 rms (i.e. 25% and 3% of the original samples, respectively) covering 11 euro area countries for the period 2010-2016.
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While we do not observe whether the rms hold deposits with and/or borrow from these banks, for the purpose of this paper, we consider a reference bank as the primary institution from which rms obtain most of short and long term credit (Ongena et al., 2015; Dwenger et al., 2018) and with which are likely to build lasting relationships in the sense of Rajan (1994, 1995) .
8 Activities related to the provision of credit and monitoring allow reference banks and rms to form ties through repeated interaction over time and across multiple nancial products. For instance, rms typically hold checking and savings account at their reference bank, while in turn banks also provides support for IPOs.
e deep and complex dimension of bank-rm relationships facilitates the storing of information and may increase the availability of funds to the rm Rajan, 1994, 1995) . 9 Moreover, these relationships imply that banks and rms are interdependent: shocks a ecting banks are likely to be re ected on customer rms, and vice versa (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011) . In this respect, some evidence is reported in appendix B: rms' total bank borrowing is strongly correlated to loans and key balance sheet variables of their reference bank.
With respect to other comparable sources of rm-bank matched data, our database presents some advantages. As noted by Dwenger et al. (2018) , nancial accounts data include a large number of SMEs (99% of our sample). In contrast, other sources of rm-bank matched data are based on the syndicated loans market, which typically involves large loans made from large banks to large rms (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Acharya and Ste en, 2015) . Alternatively, credit registry data do include small rms but are only available for individual countries (Jiménez et al., 2012 (Jiménez et al., , 2014 Andrade et al., 2018; Degryse et al., 2019) . To-date, a European-wide credit registry is not available. By using matched nancial accounts data on European rms and banks we go beyond a speci c limitation of alternative source by obtaining a cross-country panel that includes a very large number of SMEs which are likely to be most bank dependent and therefore to be a ected by their banker's exercise of market power.
Our database presents however two important limitations. First, we only have information updated on 2016 on the relationship banks in Amadeus. In other words, bank-rm records are a snapshot of borrowers-lenders relationships at one point in time and are retroactively imputed for previous years. We note however that, using equivalently sourced data for Germany, Dwenger et al. (2018) are able to obtain the relationship bank information updated over time and show that in their sample relationship are very sticky: only 3% of sampled rms every swap a lender for 6 e fuzzy merge is carried out using the Stata ado le reclink2 wri en by Micheal Blasnik which uses a bigram string comparator to calculate the fraction of consecutive character matches between two string variables (banker name). To ensure accuracy, we also perform a clerical review of all matches. 7 Many observations are lost as the "banker name" variable was not available for Italy, Belgium, Finland, Slovakia and Luxembourg. Further observations on rm-bank pairs are lost since the Lerner index cannot be estimated for Greek, Estonian and Lithuanian banks.
e remaining countries are Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). 8 As noted by Dwenger et al. (2018) , if our bank-rm matches re ect only partially true lending relationships, our estimates should be considered as lower bounds. 9 For instance, by monitoring cash ows through its checking account the bank can learn about the rm's sales. In addition, the bank reaches cost e ciencies by spreading the xed costs related to producing information over multiple products (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) .
another, and less than 2% add or interrupt a relationship bank in any given year. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the rms in our sample are SMEs which are far more likely to rely on a single lender and to face signi cant switching costs to change banker (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997) . Consistent with this view, only 9% of rms in our sample are related to more than one bank.
10 For these reasons, and because our sample period is relatively short (7 years), we regard as tenable the assumption that bank-rm relationships remain stable over our period of interest.
Second, we do not observe the amount lent by a relationship bank to a speci c rm , but rather the total amount funds borrowed by a rm in any given year -potentially from di erent banks -and we have no information on the exact share lent by each bank. We therefore work under the assumption that the relationship bank provides the largest share of loans and that the total amount of funds borrowed e ectively captures the intensive margin of the credit relationship. Available evidence also supports this assumption. For instance, Cressy and Olofsson (1997) note that the main sources of nance for European SMEs are retained earnings, trade credit and credit from a single bank, while Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that US SMEs obtain between 75% and 95% of their loans from their main bank. Considering the bank-based nature of Europe corporate nance and the relative scarcity of non-bank alternatives for SMEs, these gures are likely under-estimates in the European context. Furthermore, given that 91% of rms in our sample are related to a single bank, we believe this is a reasonable approximation. We also provide in-sample evidence showing that rms' bank credit is closely related to their reference bank's total loans (see appendix B).
Bank market power: the Lerner index
Studying the impact of bank market structure on rms' credit outcomes requires a measure of inter-bank competition. However, there is currently no consensus over the best indicator. Broadly speaking, competition metrics can be classi ed in two categories: structural and non-structural indicators. e former are theoretically rooted in the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) view whereby bank concentration creates an environment that unfavourably a ects bank conduct and performance: in other words, concentration is negatively associated with a bank's competitive conduct and favours pro tability. Related empirical research commonly uses structural measures of concentration such as the Her ndahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) or the n-rm concentration ratio to proxy for market power Hannan, 1989, 1992) .
11 Yet, recent empirical work cast doubts over the reliability of concentration as a proxy for bank competition (Bikker et al., 2012) and the contestability of the banking sector. In particular, Claessens and Laeven (2004) , Schaeck and Cihák (2012) and Love and Martínez Pería (2015) argue that concentration measures market structure rather than market conduct. Furthermore, structural indicators were found to lack consistency and robustness (Berger and Udell, 1995; Rhoades, 1995; Jackson, 1997; Hannan, 1997) . In the a empt to remedy these shortcomings, a second category of indicators related to new Industrial Organisation (IO) methods sought to measure competition directly rather than via proxies such as market shares and market structures. ese indicators include the Lerner index and the H-statistic based on the Panzar-Rosse model (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) .
e Lerner index measures a bank's ability to set its price above the marginal cost and provides a bank-speci c measure of market power. By way of interpretation, a bank with Lerner index near zero has li le market power, whereas a bank whose Lerner index is close to one is 10 ese rms are on average almost twice as large as single-bank rms: speci cally, the average size of multi-bank rms is € 6.1 million while that of single-bank rms is € 3.8 million.
11
e Hirschmann-Her ndahl index of concentration is the sum of the squares of the market shares (assets) of each bank in each country.
akin to a monopolist. e Lerner index presents multiple advantages over alternative metrics of competition. First, the Lerner index is the only bank level measure of market power in addition to the bank's market share (Beck et al., 2013) . While the Lerner index is a proxy for current and future pro ts deriving from pricing power, market share also captures the implicit rents extracted from being too big to fail. As such, market share is subject to measurement error as a proxy for pricing power. Second, the Lerner index captures pricing power on both the asset and liability side of the bank's balance sheet, since it calculates the di erences between pro ts on assets and costs of funding operations (Beck et al., 2013) . ird, unlike the H-statistic, estimating the Lerner index does not require a banking system to be in long run equilibrium (Schaeck and Cihák, 2012) . Fourth, unlike market concentration and market shares, the Lerner index does not depend on the de nition of geographic product market (Aghion et al., 2005) . is task is particularly complex for the banking industry given the extent of transnational operations.
12 As our main purpose is to examine the bank-rm level association between competition and access to credit, we follow recent literature (Maudos and de Guevara, 2007; Berger et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014; Fungáčová et al., 2014) and use the Lerner index as our main measure of competition. Given the estimates of a bank's price and marginal cost, the Lerner index is calculated as:
where P is proxied by total operating income over total assets. e marginal cost (MC) is derived from a translog function as explained in appendix A. We thus obtain a Lerner index for each bank and each year, and have a direct measure of bank market power for our main analysis. In table 1 we document that aggregate Lerner indices are meaningfully and statistically correlated with other standard measures of inter-bank competition and market structure. 13 and bank level market shares), the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the country average of the Lerner index previously estimated. All indicators are at the country-year level and are de ned so that an increase in the metric corresponds to less competition (i.e. we take the negative of the H-statistic).
e Lerner index is positively and signi cantly correlated to all other measures, which further corroborates our choice of using it as measure of inter-bank competition.
Identi cation and econometric model
Testing how bank competition a ects credit availability runs into identi cation issues. Indeed, rms' credit conditions are usually a ected by factors unrelated to the state of inter-bank competition. However, most of them -industry demand, factor endowments and prices, business cycle -can be thought of as common to all rms within an industry at a given moment in time. Additionally, as noted by Bonaccorsi di Pa i and Dell'Ariccia (2004), rms within the same industry are likely to share a similar exposure to asymmetric information problems stemming from the technology prevailing in that particular sector.
Following Weinstein (2011, 2013) , we exploit the fact that some rms are linked to banks with higher market power than other rms within the same industry in the same year. Hence, we use industry-year xed e ects to sweep out all supply-and-demand shocks and information issues shared by all rms within an industry in a given year, thus identifying how a rm's credit availability is a ected by the market power of its main lender. Speci cally, we estimate the following model:
where y f,t is a rm level outcome variable measuring access to credit, f indicates rms, b banks, i industries and t years. Speci cally, as in De Marco (2019) we use 4-digits North American Industry Classi caion System (NAICS) codes to identify 280 industrial sectors. We then use four measures of credit availability: short and long-term bank credit, trade credit and cost of funding. e rst two measures correspond to the amount of credit a rm receives by banks in any given year and is a direct indicator funds borrowed from nancial intermediaries. However, measuring credit availability directly is problematic. Since bank credit is jointly determined by supply and demand, regressing rms' bank credit on bank market power may lead to simultaneity bias if bank market power a ects both the supply of and demand for bank lending Rajan, 1994, 1995) . However, since using industry-year xed e ects already absorbs all sector-speci c cyclical demand for credit, this concern should be less severe in our set up.
14 Nonetheless, we use two additional proxies of credit conditions: trade credit and cost of funding. e idea for trade credit is as follows. In order to nance new investment, credit rationed rms will turn to more expensive sources of nance, whereas rms with access to bank credit are less likely to recur to more expensive sources. e credit borrowed from more expensive sources should then capture the extent to which rms are supply constrained by banks Rajan, 1994, 1995; Nilsen, 2002; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2007) . 15 13 is re ects the market share of the largest ve banks in each country. 14 Simultaneity bias may apply only insofar credit demand at the rm level is systematically associated to its reference bank's market power, i.e. if rms associated to banks with high market power demand systematically more (or less) credit. 15 Trade credit is a short-term loan a supplier provides to customers in concurrence with the sale of his products Recent research cast doubts on the reliability of trade credit as proxy for nancing constraint by emphasising the informational content of trade credit (Gianne i et al., 2011; Agostino and Trivieri, 2014) . Speci cally, trade credit may send a positive signal to banks on the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, in turn making banks less reluctant to lend. In this sense, rather than a substitute, trade credit may be seen as a complement to bank lending. However, since this signalling should be especially valuable for relatively uninformed banks that do not dispose of so information on rms, we regard this speci c concern to be less relevant in our analysis for it focuses on banks that are already in a lending relationship and are therefore unlikely to be uninformed.
We also construct a measure of rms' funding cost as a fourth proxy of rms credit conditions. Similarly to Fungáčová et al. (2014) and Carbo-Valverde et al. (2007) , this is the ratio between a rm's nancial expenses and total liabilities, and it is taken as a summary of rms' funding costs. As for trade credit, we would expect credit constrained rms to face higher borrowing costs.
e main dependent variable is the banks' Lerner index discussed in section 2.2. Vectors F and B contain, respectively, rm and bank level control variables. As in Beck et al. (2013) the Lerner index and all rm and bank level variables enter the model with a lag to mitigate endogeneity concerns related to reverse causality. Vector Y contains country level control variables such as real GDP growth, in ation and the sovereign yield spread.
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e interaction term is designed to capture how the e ect of bank market power on credit availability varies across rms. Finally, industry-year xed e ects (α i,t ) are included to absorb all time-varying industry-speci c shocks.
Model 1 allows testing the following theoretical predictions. First, for the information hypothesis, higher bank market power should increase the bene ts of relationship lending and hence increase credit availability for all rms across the board. Accordingly, one would expect β 1 to be positive (negative) when y f,t is bank credit (trade credit or cost of funding). Second, for the information hypothesis, by increasing the incentive to engage in relationship lending, higher bank market power (i.e. an increase in the Lerner index) should increase credit availability especially for rms facing asymmetry information problems such as small, illiquid, unpro table and opaque rms. e coe cient β 2 is then expected to be positive (negative) when y f,t is bank credit (trade credit or funding cost).
ird, for the information hypothesis, rms whose reference bank has a comparative advantage or is specialised in relationship lending -e.g. small banks -should bene t relatively more of lower levels of inter-bank competition. Accordingly, the coe cient β 1 is expected to be more positive (negative) when y f,t is bank credit (trade credit or funding cost) when the estimating sample is restricted to rms borrowing from small banks. (Nilsen, 2002) and it typically is an inferior substitute to bank loans for a number of reasons: rst, unlike bank loans trade credit is intrinsically linked to the purchase of goods; second, while bank loans are long-term, trade credit is usually very short-term (30 days in the US according to Nilsen (2002) ); third, given the supplier is not necessarily a nancier, the customer faces signi cant late payment penalties (both explicitly pecuniary as well as implicit such as the cost of damaging a long-term relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) ). erefore, while trade credit is available to most rms, they usually prefer bank loans given the former's una ractiveness. For instance, ? calculates that foregoing trade credit early discount correspond to an annualised borrowing rate of 44.6%.In studying how bank market power a ects credit availability by contrasting bank and trade credit, we also make the implicit assumption that the market power of suppliers providing trade credit is industry speci c. is is supported by the observation that discount terms in trade credit contracts are typically set at the industry level (Dun and Breadstreet, 1970; ?) . Hence, as noted by Petersen and Rajan (1994) , using industry dummies will also control for di erences in terms and conditions for trade credit nancing across industries.
is variable measures the di erence between the yield on a country's 10-year government bond and the yield on the 10-year German's Bund. As in (Albertazzi et al., 2014) , this variable aims to capture cross-country divergence in funding conditions arising during the sovereign debt crisis.
Results
is section presents the main results. We rst focus on the overall e ect of bank market power on rms' access to credit and then look at how this relationship varies across rms and banks.
3.1 e e ect of bank market power on rms' access to credit
Estimates on the overall impact of bank competition on rm's access to credit are reported in table 2. Speci cally, we estimate model 1 with industry-year xed e ects and cluster standard errors at the bank level. We test here the rst theoretical predictions outlined in section 2.3: for the information hypothesis, higher bank market power should be related to higher credit availability for customer rms. e test therefore rests on the sign and statistical signi cance of β 1 . In table 2 we report four di erent panels, each containing a di erent measure of rms' credit constraint. Across all speci cations, results strongly reject the information hypothesis: Banks' Lerner index is negatively related to short-and long-term bank credit and positively related to trade credit and cost of funding. In other words, rms whose reference banks enjoy high market power tend to borrow less, draw more trade credit and face higher funding costs, consistent with the notion that market power has a negative e ect on credit availability. Taken together, these ndings suggest that rms served by banks with high market power are systematically more likely to faced tighter credit conditions. Moreover, the result is economically signi cant: For the full speci cation (column 3 of each panel), estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in banks' Lerner index (i.e. 0.16) is associated to a 20% decrease in both short-and longterm credit, to a 14% increase in trade credit and to a 8% increase in funding cost by customer rms. ese results hold across di erent speci cations. For each panel, the second column adds add rm level variables in order to control for rm balance sheet characteristics that may explain some of the cross-rm variation in credit availability. First, the log of rm sales complements the log of rm total assets in capturing rm size and is included since a rm's nancing pa erns vary widely with size (Beck et al., 2008 (Beck et al., , 2013 . 17 Second, rm cash ows and pro tability (the ratio of pro t before taxes over total assets) are added as observable measures of rm performance and quality (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2007) . ird, rm default risk is de ned as the ratio of operating pro ts to interest paid. As noted by Carbo-Valverde et al. (2007) this variable captures operating risk by showing how many times interest paid are covered by operating pro ts. Fourth, rm transparency is de ned as the ratio of tangible xed assets over total assets and measures the extent to which a rm can post tangible collateral to obtain external nancing (Bonaccorsi di Pa i and Dell 'Ariccia, 2004; Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Fungáčová et al., 2014) . Similarly, in the third column of each panel we add bank-level variables to capture bank balance sheet characteristics that are traditionally considered as determinants of credit supply. First, bank credit risk is de ned as non-performing loans over total loans and control for the (ex-post) quality of banks' loan portfolios (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2007) . Second, bank pro tability, measured by return on assets, stands to capture any linkage between bank performance and credit supply (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2007) .
ird, bank risk is measured by the log of the Z-score (Beck et al., 2013) and measures distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952) . In the fourth column of each panel, we re-estimate the model using a Lerner index calculated from a euro area level cost function (rather than country by country) as discussed in section 2.2. 
e e ect of bank market power across rms
In this section we investigate how bank market power a ects nancial constraint across rms to test the second theoretical predictions outlined in section 2.3. For the information hypothesis we would expect nancially constrained rms -small, unpro table, illiquid and opaque -linked to banks with higher market power to enjoy be er access to credit relative to large, high quality and transparent rms. is test therefore hinges on estimates of β 2 as modelled in 1. Estimates are reported in table 3. As before, we report four di erent panels, each containing a di erent measure of rms' credit constraint. First, we look at di erential e ects of bank competition for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
18 In table table 3 , the interaction term in the rst column of each panel indicate that SMEs serviced by banks with higher bank market obtain less short-and long-term bank credit, increase trade credit by less than larger rms, but do not face higher funding costs than larger rms. Speci cally, the reduction in short and long-term bank credit associated with a one standard deviation increase in banks' Lerner is, respectively, 15% and 12% larger for SMEs. We interpret this ndings as suggestive that higher bank market power leads to more severe credit rationing for small rms, which in turn nd it more di cult to fully o set the reduction in bank credit with trade credit. is evidence is consistent with ? and the well-established notion that small rms are more bank-dependent and more vulnerable to information problems than large rms. Indeed, information asymmetries are thought to be stronger for small rms due to their restricted credit history, short track record and lower ability to provide collateral. Conversely, large rms may bene t from internal capital market and may face less nancing constraints (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2007; Andrieu et al., 2018) .
Second, according to the information hypothesis, banks should lend more to lower quality rms in more concentrated markets. Again, we nd evidence against this theoretical prediction. Estimates in columns 2,3 and 4 in each panel broadly indicate that rms with high cash ows bu er the negative e ect of higher bank market power: on average, these recur less to trade credit, have a lower reduction in both short and long-term credit, but do not face systematically higher funding costs. Similarly, for a given level of bank market power, high pro t rms recur to less trade credit but their bank credit is no less restricted than other rms, nor do they face higher borrowing costs.
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is is based on the de nition of Small and Medium Enterprises by the European Union. A rm is considered a SME if it has (i) 250 or less employees or (ii) operating revenue in excess of EUR 50 million and total assets in excess of EUR 43 million. ird, under the information hypothesis opaque rms should bene t of higher credit availability when serviced by banks with higher market power. Findings presented in column 4 of each panel strongly reject this hypothesis. Not only the adverse impact of market power on both bank and trade credit borrowed abates with rm's transparency, but the e ect is reversed for short-term and trade credit for highly transparent rms. is strong heterogeneous e ect is particularly evident by looking at gure 1. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in banks' Lerner is associated to a 40% decrease in short-term bank credit for a opaque rm (bo om decile) as opposed to a 16% increase in bank credit for a highly transparent rm (top decile). ese results suggest that more opaque rms are more negatively a ected by credit rationing, since information issues are more severe for borrowers that can post only limited physical collateral as guarantee for their borrowing (Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Bonaccorsi di Pa i and Dell'Ariccia, 2004) .
Overall, these results reject the information hypothesis in favour of the market power hypothesis. Indeed, higher bank market power is especially detrimental for credit availability precisely where the information hypothesis predicts it should be most bene cial: among rms related to banks with high market power, opaque rms receive less short and long-term bank credit, draw more trade credit and face higher funding costs. Conversely, high bank market power appear to ma er less for the credit availability of higher quality rms that are least exposed to information asymmetries.
e e ect of bank market power across banks
Finally, we test for heterogeneity in the impact of bank market power on rms' nancial constraint across banks. While we found no evidence supporting the information hypothesis either directly nor across rms, we can use variation across banks to uncover evidence on the way inter-bank competition a ects credit availability. In particular, in this section we test the third theoretical predictions outlined in section 2.3: For the information hypothesis, among banks with high market power we would expect small and cooperative banks to grant be er access to credit owing to their greater interest in sustaining long-term credit relationships. Firms borrowing from small banks with high market power may obtain be er credit conditions. According to Berger and Udell (2002) and Stein (2002) , small banks may have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis large banks in relationship lending due to their simple organisational structure that is more congenial to the gathering of so information.
e idea is that relationship lending requires the gathering of so information on borrowers as opposed to transaction lending that only requires hard information. In this activity, the size and organisational complexity of a bank is likely to ma er. For smallest banks, the agency problem between management and loan o cers -the la er being the likely depositary of the most valuable so information on borrowers -is typically resolved with the president of the bank making or reviewing most of the business loans. In contrast, larger and more complex banks usually require more layers of management that may hinder the production of information-driven small business loans as opposed to their core business, i.e. transaction-driven loans and other capital market services for large rms. Furthermore, large, hierarchical rms may also be at a disadvantage in conveying the kind of so information associated with relationship lending. A second argument relies on the observation that small banks are predominantly relationship lenders, while larger banks are predominantly transactional lenders. As noted by Boot and akor (2000) , low inter-bank competition increases banks' marginal rents from relationship lending, thus encouraging investment in relationshipspeci c investments. is can be seen as a particular application of the general principle that low competition increases relationship-speci c investment (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982) . erefore, for the information hypothesis one would expect that rms associated to smaller banks with larger market power bene t of larger credit availability given their banker's strong incentives to engage in relationship lending and exploit its comparative advantage vis-à-vis larger intermediaries.
Estimates reported in table 4 provide some evidence supporting this hypothesis. We report four di erent panels, each containing a di erent measure of rms' credit constraint, and estimate model 1 by spli ing the sample in four buckets corresponding to four quartiles of bank distribution. We choose this procedure, instead of using interaction terms since double interactions between two bank level variables (Lerner × bank size) generate high collinearity among covariates. Findings indicate that the negative relation bank market power and short and long-term borrowing is stronger (more negative) for rms borrowing from larger banks. e magnitude of this e ect is economically sizeable: on average a one-standard-deviation increase in bank market power (i.e. 0.16) is associated to a 52% (42%) reduction in short-(long) term credit for rms borrowing from large banks (4 th quartile), while the e ects are undistinguishable from zero for rms borrowing from smaller banks (1 st quartile). On the other hand, the results in panels 3 and 4 indicate that the positive relation between bank market power and rms' trade credit and funding cost remains broadly similar for rms borrowing from banks of di erent sizes. ese results are broadly consistent with the information hypothesis: insofar low competition fosters the establishment of bank-lender relationships, and that small banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, our results indicate that rms borrowing from large banks with high market power experience have worse credit availability than rms borrowing from small banks with high market power. In this sense our results are in line with Berger et al. (2005 Berger et al. ( , 2017 and Berger and Black (2011) .
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated how inter-bank competition a ects rms' credit availability using a rm-bank matched database to test for the information and market power hypotheses. e former holds that lower competition encourages banks to establish long-term relationships with rms, thus improving credit availability; the la er expects bank market power to worsen credit conditions for borrowers owing to misallocations and distortions generally associated with the lack of competition.
Results reject the information hypothesis in favour of the market power hypothesis. Lower inter-bank competition is associated to lower, not higher, credit availability and higher borrowing costs for customer rms. Furthermore, the fact that quantity and price of bank credit (borrowing and funding costs/trade credit) move in opposite directions suggests that rms linked to banks with high market power are more credit constrained and more likely to turn to alternative more expensive sources of nance than rms linked to banks with low market power.
Looking at the cross-section of rms, we nd the e ect of bank market power on credit availability to be especially detrimental precisely where the information hypothesis predicts it should be most bene cial: For a given level of bank market power, opaque rms receive less short and long-term credit, draw more trade credit and face higher funding costs than transparent rms. Conversely, we nd only limited evidence supporting the information hypothesis in the crosssection of banks. For a given level of bank market power, rms related to larger banks obtain less short and long-term bank credit than rms serviced by larger commercial lenders, but bank size does not seem to ma er in terms of trade credit and funding costs.
Overall, we consider our results to be mainly consistent with the market power hypothesis, whereby lower inter-bank competition exacerbates the nancial constraint of borrowers most exposed to information problems. However, our ndings do not exclude that low inter-bank competition may bene t credit availability by encouraging credit relationships established between small banks and small rms who have a particular interest in forming long-term ties.
ese ndings have direct implications for policy. e current impetus towards cross-country banking consolidation in the EU has the potential to signi cantly increase the market power of individual banking groups and to lower the level of competition in the banking sector. While policy makers have so far generally welcomed and encouraged these activities, our results suggests that e ciency and nancial stability considerations should be weighed against the potential negative consequences for rms' access to credit, especially for small and medium enterprises.
Appendix A Estimating the Lerner index
e Lerner index is de ned as the ratio of the di erence between price of output and marginal cost to the price. e price of output is the average price of bank output computed as the ratio of total income to total assets. e marginal cost is obtained by estimating a translogarithmic cost function with one output (total asset), and three proxies for input prices (labour, borrowing and capital). As in Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2010) where b stands for banks and t for years. In model (1), T C denotes total costs (sum of total interest paid and operating costs), y total banking assets, w 1 labour price (sta expenses divided by total assets), w 2 the price of physical capital (non-interest expenses divided by total assets) and w 3 the price of borrowed funds (total interest paid divided by customer and short term funding). 19 Model (2) is estimated on a sample of 3650 euro area banks extracted from Orbis Bank Focus covering the period 2010-2016. e estimation is carried out country by country with bank-xed e ects.
e estimated coe cients are employed to derive the marginal cost (MC):
M C b,t = T C b,t y b,t α 1 +α 2 ln y b,t + 1 2 3 j=1γ j ln w b,t,j +δ 3 T rend t Finally, the bank-speci c Lerner index is obtained as:
Appendix B On the relation between rms and main banks
Bank credit obtained by rms may be an invalid proxy for the unobserved share of borrowing from the main banks. To test for its validity we rst aggregate rm bank credit across rms for each bank, so to create a bank level variable that collects all bank borrowing by rms connected to that bank. While this is measure is spurious as banks ( rms) likely lend (borrow) to other rms (from other banks) unreported in our database, unconditional correlations between bank and rm variables are high: the aggregate borrowing of rms moves closely to the total lending, total assets, leverage and non-performing loans (NPL) of the bank reported as their main lender ( rst column of table 5. is suggests there are indeed interdependencies between borrowers and lenders that may re ect credit relations. Still, it may be that rm aggregate borrowing and bank total lending co-move due to common cyclical trends. To check for that, we regress rm total borrowing on bank total lending conditional on several macroeconomic indicators. Estimates are reported in table 6. Conditional analysis con rms that rm aggregate borrowing by bank is correlated with bank total loans even when controlling for cyclical factors. Elasticities coe cients are positive and signi cant. For instance, 1% increase in bank loans is associated to a 77.5% increase in aggregate rm borrowing. 
